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Abstract—This work considers the downlink of a cloud radio
access network (C-RAN), in which a control unit (CU) encodes
confidential messages, each of which is intended for a user
equipment (UE) and is to be kept secret from all the other
UEs. As per the C-RAN architecture, the encoded baseband
signals are quantized and compressed prior to the transfer to
distributed radio units (RUs) that are connected to the CU
via finite-capacity fronthaul links. This work argues that the
quantization noise introduced by fronthaul quantization can be
leveraged to act as “artificial” noise in order to enhance the rates
achievable under secrecy constraints. To this end, it is proposed
to control the statistics of the quantization noise by applying
multivariate, or joint, fronthaul quantization/compression at the
CU across all outgoing fronthaul links. Assuming wiretap coding,
the problem of jointly optimizing the precoding and multivariate
compression strategies, along with the covariance matrices of
artificial noise signals generated by RUs, is formulated with the
goal of maximizing the weighted sum of achievable secrecy rates
while satisfying per-RU fronthaul capacity and power constraints.
After showing that the artificial noise covariance matrices can
be set to zero without loss of optimaliy, an iterative optimization
algorithm is derived based on the concave convex procedure
(CCCP), and some numerical results are provided to highlight
the advantages of leveraging quantization noise as artificial noise.
Index Terms—C-RAN, physical-layer security, fronthaul quan-
tization, beamforming.
I. INTRODUCTION
Motivated by the original works on the wiretap channel
[1][2], physical-layer security techniques have been exten-
sively studied as effective means of protecting data secrecy
for communications over wireless channels in a variety of
scenarios [3][4]. One of the key techniques that have been
devised for enhancing the rates at which information can
be transmitted securely is the addition of artificial noise at
the transmitter [5]-[10]. This strategy finds its theoretical
justification in the prefix channel approach that was shown
in [2] to achieve the secrecy capacity of a general wiretap
channel.
In this work, we study physical-layer secure communication
in the context of the downlink of cloud radio access networks
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Figure 1. Illustration of the downlink of a C-RAN system with confidential
messages for NR = 2 RUs, NU = 2 UEs, nR,i = 2 RU antennas and
nU,k = 2 UE antennas.
(C-RANs). In a C-RAN, a control unit (CU) performs joint
encoding of the messages intended for all the user equipments
(UEs) located in the geographical area covered by the radio
units (RUs) connected to the CU. The encoded baseband
signals are then transferred to the RUs on the fronthaul link
in analog or digital format. For digital fronthauling, the CU
quantizes and compresses the encoded baseband signals prior
to the transfer to the RUs due to the limited bit rate of the
fronthaul links [11][12].
In this work, we argue that the quantization noise introduced
by fronthaul quantization can be leveraged to act as artificial
noise in order to enhance the rates achievable under secrecy
constraints. To this end, as an extension of the work [11],
we propose to apply multivariate, or joint, fronthaul quanti-
zation/compression [13] at the CU for all outgoing fronthaul
links in order to control the statistics of the quantization noise.
Multivariate quantization/compression was recently shown in
[11] to improve the performance of C-RANs without secrecy
constraints with respect to standard per-fronthaul link point-
to-point quantization/compression.
In the rest of this paper, we first formulate the problem
of jointly optimizing precoding, multivariate compression and
the covariance matrices of artificial noise signals generated
by RUs, with the goal of maximizing the weighted sum of
achievable secrecy rates of the intended UEs subject to per-
RU fronthaul capacity and power constraints (Sec. III). We
show that the artificial noise covariance matrices can be set
to zero with no loss of optimality and hence focus on the
joint optimization of precoding and multivariate compression.
An iterative optimization algorithm is then derived based
on the concave convex procedure (CCCP) (Sec. III), and
numerical evidence is provided to highlight the advantages
of the proposed schemes (Sec. IV).
II. SYSTEM MODEL
We consider the downlink of a C-RAN in which a single
CU controls NR RUs. The CU communicates with the ith
RU through a fronthaul link of capacity Ci bits/s/Hz where
the normalization is with respect to the downlink bandwidth.
The NR RUs transmit signals to NU UEs located in the union
of the coverage areas of the RUs. We define the sets NR ,
{1, . . . , NR} and NU , {1, . . . , NU} of the RUs and the UEs,
and denote the numbers of antennas of RU i and UE k as nR,i
and nU,k, respectively. An illustration is shown in Fig. 1.
The signal yk ∈ CnU,k×1 received by UE k is given by
yk =
∑
i∈NR
Hk,ixi + zk, (1)
where Hk,i ∈ CnU,k×nR,i represents the channel response
matrix from RU i to UE k; xi ∈ CnR,i×1 indicates the signal
transmitted by RU i; and zk ∈ CnU,k×1 is the additive noise at
UE k distributed as zk ∼ CN (0,Σzk). Each RU i is subject
to the power constraint E ‖xi‖2 ≤ Pi.
The information messages Mk ∈ {1, . . . , 2nRk}, each of
rate Rk bits/s/Hz, are encoded within a block of n channel
uses, where n is large enough to justify the use of information-
theoretic limits. The message Mk is intended for UE k ∈
NU and is required to be kept secret from the other UEs.
Specifically, we impose that the UEs l ∈ NU \{k} be unable to
decode the messageMk even in the worst-case scenario where
they cooperate since the CU cannot control the activities of
the UEs (see [1]). The messages {Mk}k∈NU are processed by
the CU in the two steps described in the following subsections
before being transferred to the RUs.
A. Linear Precoding
The CU first encodes each message Mk using a wiretap
code [1] and obtaining an encoded signal sk ∈ Cdk×1, which
is distributed as sk ∼ CN (0, I). We assume that the number
dk of data streams satisfies the condition dk ≤ min{nR, nU,k}
with the notation nR ,
∑
i∈NR
nR,i. In order to enable
the management of the inter-UE interference and to enhance
secrecy, the CU performs linear precoding, or beamforming,
with a precoding matrix A ∈ CnR×d, yielding the precoded
signal x˜ = [x˜1; . . . ; x˜NR ] ∈ CnR×1 with
x˜ = As, (2)
where x˜i ∈ CnR,i×1 is the signal to be communicated to RU i;
s , [s1; . . . ; sNU ] is the vector of the signals encoded for the
UEs; and we have defined the notation d ,
∑
k∈NU
dk. We
note that the discussion can be easily extended to systems, in
which the CU performs non-linear secrecy dirty-paper coding
(S-DPC) precoding proposed in [10].
B. Fronthaul Compression
The precoded baseband signal x˜i needs to be compressed
prior to transmission to the RU, since the CU communicates
to RU i through a fronthaul link of capacity Ci bits/s/Hz.
Using standard rate-distortion considerations, we model the
impact of compression by adding a quantization noise qi to
the compression input signal x˜i so that the compression output
signal xˆi is given as
xˆi = x˜i + qi, (3)
where the quantization noise qi is independent of the signal
x˜i and is distributed as qi ∼ CN (0,Ωi,i). Each RU i
decompresses the baseband signal xˆi based on the bit stream
received on the fronthaul link. We emphasize that, as done
in, e.g., [11], quantization is not designed so as to minimize
the (e.g., quadratic) distortion between the precoded signals
x˜i and the compressed signals xˆi, but rather with the aim
of maximizing the weighted sum of achievable secrecy rates,
which will be defined in Sec. II-D.
In the standard point-to-point compression approach [14], in
which the precoded signals x˜i and x˜j for different RUs i 6= j
are separately compressed, the quantization noises qi and qj
are independent, i.e., Ωi,j = 0 for i 6= j. Instead, multivariate,
or joint, compression [13, Ch. 9] allows the CU to correlate
the quantization noises q1, . . . ,qNR by jointly compressing
the signals x˜1, . . . , x˜NR . This adds a further degree of freedom
to the system design, which will be leveraged here to enhance
physical-layer security. It was shown in [11, Sec. IV-D] that
multivariate compression can be implemented with no loss
of optimality using a low-complexity sequential processing
architecture.
Specifically, in this work, we propose to shape the quantiza-
tion noise signals in order to enhance the secrecy performance
by controlling the correlation matrix Ω of the quantization
noise vector q , [q1; . . . ;qNR ], where the covariance matrix
Ω , E[qq†] is given as a block matrix whose (i, j)th block is
Ωi,j , E[qiq
†
j ]. As mentioned, this control can be realized
by means of multivariate compression, which was recently
demonstrated in [11] to achieve performance gains in terms
of non-secrecy information rates.
It is a classic result in network information theory that
the quantized signals (3) with the given quantization noise
covariance Ω can be recovered by the RUs if the conditions
gS (A,Ω) ,
∑
i∈S
h (xi)− h (xˆS |x˜)
=
∑
i∈S
log2 det
(
E
†
i (AA
† +Ω)Ei
)
− log2 det
(
E
†
SΩES
)
≤
∑
i∈S
Ci (4)
are satisfied for all subsets S ⊆ NR, where we have defined
the set xˆS , {xˆi}i∈S and the matrix ES obtained by stacking
the matrices Ei for i ∈ S horizontally with the matrices Ei ∈
CnR×nR,i having all-zero elements except for the rows from
(
∑i−1
j=1 nR,j +1) to (
∑i
j=1 nR,j) being the identity matrix of
size nR,i [13, Ch. 9].
C. Artificial Noise
Based on the decompressed baseband signal xˆi, each RU i
creates the signal xi to be transmitted in the downlink as
xi = xˆi + ni, (5)
where ni represents the artificial noise signal generated by RU
i and is distributed as ni ∼ CN (0,Φi). The artificial noise
signals ni are independent across the index i since each signal
ni is locally produced by the corresponding RU. As for the
quantization noise signal qi, we need to carefully design the
covariance matrix Φi based on the channel matrices in order
to enhance secrecy.
D. Achievable Secrecy Rates
The signal yk in (1) received by UE k can be written as
yk =HkAksk +
∑
l∈NU\{k}
HkAlsl+Hk(q+ n)+ zk, (6)
where we defined the channel matrix Hk , [Hk,1 . . . Hk,NR ]
from all the RUs to UE k, the aggregate vector n ,
[n1; . . . ;nNR ] of the artificial noise signals and the submatrix
Ak ∈ CnR×dk of A multiplied to the signal sk encoded
for UE k. The first term in (6) indicates the desired signal
to be decoded by the receiving UE k, the second term
represents the inter-UE interference signals, which encode
the unintended messages, and the third and last terms are
channelized quantization noise and antenna additive noise
signals, respectively. Eq. (6) suggests that a joint design of A
and Ω has the potential to jointly “shape” the useful signals
and the quantization noise signals to enhance the secrecy rate.
Assuming that each UE k decodes the message Mk based
on the signal yk in (6) while treating the interference signals
as noise, it was shown in [1] that the rate
Rk = [fk (A,Ω,Φ)]
+
(7)
is achievable for UE k ensuring that the other UEs cannot
decode the message Mk, where we defined the function
fk (A,Ω,Φ) , I (sk;yk)− I (sk;yk¯) (8)
= φ

HkRlH†k, ∑
l∈NU\{k}
HkRlH
†
k +Hk(Ω+Φ)H
†
k +Σzk


− φ

Hk¯RkH†k¯, ∑
l∈NU\{k}
Hk¯RlH
†
k¯
+Hk¯(Ω+Φ)H
†
k¯
+Σzk¯

 ,
with the functions φ(A,B) , log2 det(A + B) −
log2 det(B) and [x]
+ = max(0, x) and the notations Φ ,
diag({Φi}i∈NR) and Rk , AkA†k. The vector yk¯, defined as
yk¯ , [y1; . . . ;yk−1;yk+1; . . . ;yNU ] = Hk¯x+ zk¯, (9)
represents the vector obtained by stacking the signals yl
received by the malicious UEs l ∈ NU \ {k}, where we have
defined the notations Hk¯ , [H
†
1 . . .H
†
k−1H
†
k+1 . . .H
†
NU
]†
and zk¯ , [z
†
1 . . . z
†
k−1z
†
k+1 . . . z
†
NU
]†. The maximization of
the secrecy sum-rate over the quantization noise covariance
matrix Ω entails that the rate loss induced by the quantization
noise is minimized at the intended UE while it is maximized
at the unintended UEs.
III. PROBLEM DEFINITION AND OPTIMIZATION
We aim at optimizing the precoding matrix A, the quan-
tization noise covariance matrix Ω and the artificial noise
covariance matrixΦ with the goal of maximizing the weighted
sum of secrecy rates subject to the per-RU power and the
fronthaul capacity constraints. The problem is stated as
maximize
A,{Ω,Φ0}
∑
k∈NU
wk [fk (A,Ω,Φ)]
+
(10a)
s.t. gS (A,Ω) ≤
∑
i∈S
Ci, for all S ⊆ NR, (10b)
tr
(
E
†
iAA
†Ei +Ωi,i +Φi
)
≤ Pi, for all i ∈ NR. (10c)
The following lemma shows that we can reduce the optimiza-
tion domain without loss of optimality.
Lemma 1. Setting Φ = 0 in the problem (10), which
corresponds to adding no artificial noise at the RUs, does
not cause any loss of optimality.
Proof. Suppose that an optimal solution (A∗,Ω∗,Φ∗) exists
with Ω∗ 6= 0. We can then define another solution given by
(A∗,Ω∗ + Φ∗,0) that achieves exactly the same objective
(10a) without violating any of the constraints. This is because
the left-hand side of the fronthaul capacity constraint (4) is
non-increasing with respect to the covariance matrix Ω, that
is, adding quantization noise can only alleviate the fronthaul
overhead and hence any artificial noise added by the RUs can
be directly added to the quantization noise without loss of
optimality.
From Lem. 1, we set Φ = 0 without loss of optimality.
However, it is still not easy to solve the problem (10) due
to the non-smoothness (and non-convexity) of the objective
function. In order to make the problem more tractable, we
propose to solve an alternative problem obtained by replacing
the objective function with a smooth function∑
k∈NU
wkfk (A,Ω) , (11)
where we remove the dependence on the covariance Φ =
0. Then, solving the obtained problem with respect to
the variables R , {Rk}k∈NU and Ω is a difference-
of-convex (DC) program, and we can adopt an itera-
tive algorithm based on the CCCP as in [11]. The de-
tailed algorithm is described in Algorithm I, where we de-
fined the functions f˜k({R(t+1),Ω(t+1)}, {R(t),Ω(t)}) and
g˜S({R(t+1),Ω(t+1)}, {R(t),Ω(t)}) as
f˜k
(
{R(t+1),Ω(t+1)}, {R(t),Ω(t)}
)
(12)
, log2 det
(∑
l∈NU
HkR
(t+1)
l H
†
k +HkΩ
(t+1)H
†
k +Σzk
)
− log2 det

 ∑
l∈NU\{k}
HkR
(t)
l H
†
k +HkΩ
(t)H
†
k +Σzk


− log2 det
(∑
l∈NU
Hk¯R
(t)
l H
†
k¯
+Hk¯Ω
(t)H
†
k¯
+Σzk¯
)
+ log2 det

 ∑
l∈NU\{k}
Hk¯R
(t+1)
l H
†
k¯
+Hk¯Ω
(t+1)H
†
k¯
+Σzk¯


−ϕ
( ∑
l∈NU\{k}
HkR
(t+1)
l H
†
k +HkΩ
(t+1)H
†
k +Σzk ,∑
l∈NU\{k}
HkR
(t)
l H
†
k +HkΩ
(t)H
†
k +Σzk
)
−ϕ
( ∑
l∈NU
Hk¯R
(t+1)
l H
†
k¯
+Hk¯Ω
(t+1)H
†
k¯
+Σzk¯ ,∑
l∈NU
Hk¯R
(t)
l H
†
k¯
+Hk¯Ω
(t)H
†
k¯
+Σzk¯
)
,
and
g˜S
(
{R(t+1),Ω(t+1)}, {R(t),Ω(t)}
)
(13)
,
∑
i∈S
log2 det
(
E
†
i (
∑
k∈NU
R
(t)
k +Ω
(t))Ei
)
− log2 det
(
E
†
SΩ
(t+1)ES
)
+
∑
i∈S
ϕ
( ∑
k∈NU
E
†
iR
(t+1)
k Ei +E
†
iΩ
(t+1)Ei,∑
k∈NU
E
†
iR
(t)
k Ei +E
†
iΩ
(t)Ei
)
with the definition ϕ(X,Y) , log det (Y) + tr(Y−1(X −
Y))/ ln 2.
After convergence of Algorithm 1, the actual precoding
matrix Ak for UE k is obtained via rank reduction as
Ak ← VkD1/2k , where Dk is a diagonal matrix whose
diagonal elements are the dk leading eigenvalues of R
(t+1)
k
and the columns of Vk are the corresponding eigenvectors.
This transformation from R
(t+1)
k to Ak may cause subop-
timality (in terms of local optima) when the rank of the
matrix R
(t+1)
k is larger than dk. However, note that the
obtained precoding matrices {Ak}k∈NU together with Ω(t+1)
are feasible in that they satisfy the conditions (10b) and (10c),
since the matrices {R(t+1)k }k∈NU satisfy (10b) and (10c) at
each iteration. We also mention that, when the matrices A and
Ω are optimized upon as per problem (10), we necessarily have
that fk (A,Ω) ≥ 0. The reason is that it is always possible to
obtain fk (A,Ω) = 0 by setting Ak = 0 in order to satisfy
the constraints (10b) and (10c).
IV. NUMERICAL RESULTS
In this section, we present numerical results to validate the
effectiveness of the proposed secure design based on mul-
tivariate compression. We compare four different strategies,
Algorithm 1 DC programming algorithm for problem (10)
1. Initialize the matrices R(1) and Ω(1) to arbitrary feasible
positive semidefinite matrices for problem (10) and set t = 1.
2. Update the matrices R(t+1) and Ω(t+1) as a solution of the
convex problem
maximize
R(t+1),Ω(t+1)0
∑
k∈NU
wkf˜k
(
{R(t+1),Ω(t+1)}, {R(t),Ω(t)}
)
s.t. g˜S
(
{R(t+1),Ω(t+1)}, {R(t),Ω(t)}
)
≤
∑
i∈S
Ci, for all S ⊆ NR,
∑
k∈NU
tr
(
E
†
iR
(t+1)
k Ei
)
+ tr(Ω
(t+1)
i,i )
≤ Pi, for all i ∈ NR.
3. Stop if a convergence criterion is satisfied. Otherwise, set
t← t+ 1 and go back to Step 2.
i.e., non-secure and secure design based on point-to-point and
multivariate fronthaul compression strategies. For the non-
secure design, the problem (10) is tackled without taking into
account the second term in (8) that represents the penalty
for guaranteeing the security. The so-obtained precoding and
quantization noise covariance matrices are then used in (7)
to evaluate the secrecy sum-rate. Unless stated otherwise, we
focus on evaluating the average secrecy sum-rate performance
given in (10a). We assume that the locations of RUs and
UEs are sampled from a uniform distribution within a square
area of side length 500m, and the channel matrices Hk,i are
modeled as Hk,i =
√
γk,iH
w
k,i, where the path-loss γk,i is
obtained as γk,i = 1/(1 + (dk,i/d0)
α) with α, dk,i and d0
being the path-loss exponent, the distance between RU i and
UE k and the reference distance, respectively, and the elements
of the channel matrices Hwk,i are independent and identically
distributed (i.i.d.) as CN (0, 1). We also assume that Pi = P ,
Ci = C and Σzk = I for all i ∈ NR and k ∈ NU , and α = 3
and d0 = 50m.
In Fig. 2, we plot the average secrecy sum-rate versus the
transmission power P for the downlink of a C-RAN system
with NR = 2, NU = 3, nU,k = 1 and C = 2 bits/s/Hz. It is
seen that the secure design significantly outperforms the non-
secure design. Also, it is observed that multivariate compres-
sion yields a significant performance gain that is increasing
with the transmission power P . This is because the impact of
the quantization noise Hkq in (6) compared to the additive
noise zk is more significant when the SNR is large at the UE
side. It is noted that the secrecy sum-rate of the secure design
saturates to a finite level at high-SNR, since, in this regime,
the performance is limited by the power of the quantization
noise that does not decrease with the SNR. Moreover, the
performance of the non-secure design is degraded in the high-
SNR regime due to the enhanced decodability of the messages
of the unintended UEs. We also observe that, comparing the
curves with (nR,i, nU,k) = (1, 1) and (nR,i, nU,k) = (2, 1)
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Figure 2. Average secrecy sum-rate versus the transmission power P for the
downlink of a C-RAN with NR = 2, NU = 3, nU,k = 1 and C = 2
bits/s/Hz.
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Figure 3. Average secrecy sum-rate and non-secrecy sum-rate versus the
number NU of UEs for the downlink of a C-RAN with NR = 3, nR,i =
nU,k = 1, P = 20 dB and C = 1 bits/s/Hz.
suggests that increasing the number of RU antennas results in
improved performance since the additional excessive antennas
can be leveraged to obtain beamforming gains.
Fig. 3 plots the average secrecy sum-rate, along with the
standard “non-secrecy” sum-rate obtained without imposing
secrecy constraints, versus the number NU of UEs for the
downlink of C-RAN with NR = 3, nR,i = nU,k = 1,
P = 20 dB and C = 1 bits/s/Hz. The “non-secrecy” rates
are obtained by plugging the precoding and quantization
noise covariance matrices of the non-secure design into the
weighted sum
∑
k∈NU
wkR
′
k of rates R
′
k = I(sk;yk) that
are achievable without secrecy constraints [11, Eq. (13)]. We
observe that, unlike the non-secrecy rate, as the number NU
of UEs increases, the secrecy rate of all schemes becomes
worse due to the increased numberNU−1 of eavesdroppers on
each messageMk. However, the proposed secure design based
on multivariate compression provides a significant benefit in
mitigating the impairments from the eavesdroppers compared
to the other schemes. In particular, for NU = 6, multivariate
compression yields a 51% sum-rate gain under the secrecy
constraint while about 9% is gained without secrecy constraint.
This demonstrates the additional role of artificial noise that
quantization noise shaping plays under secrecy constraint.
V. CONCLUSIONS
This work has proposed to leverage the quantization noise
that is inevitably added by fronthaul compression in a C-RAN
downlink as “artificial” noise for enhancing the rate achievable
under secrecy constraints. To this end, we have investigated the
application of multivariate fronthaul quantization/compression
at the CU in order to control the statistics of the quantiza-
tion noise across all the outgoing fronthaul links. We have
formulated the joint optimization problem of the precoding
and quantization noise covariance matrices for maximizing
the weighted sum of secrecy rates of the UEs subject to the
per-RU fronthaul capacity and power constraints. Numerical
results were provided to verify the effectiveness of multivariate
compression in enhancing secret communication.
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